"I listened to the Prosecutor and I saw that he did not have any ideas about us. He was ignorant of our ways and feelings. I looked at the Judge and the prosecutor and the thought came to me that they were ants and in engaging with them we were dwarfing ourselves. It is a curse to be a Judge when you believe that you hold the life of a person in your hand. Only God holds our lives in his hands. He gives it and He alone can take it." 5 The question about whether judges can be more than ants is, in my view, the same as the central question about the rule of law -whether there is an intrinsic relationship between law and justice. That there is such a relationship was assumed by many of the central figures at the Hearing. For example, in his opening address Archbishop Desmond Tutu said that the Legal Hearing was the "most important of the professional hearings", almost as important as the "victim/survivor hearings". 6 And he excoriated the judges for their failure to attend. Judges, he said, were faced with moral choices under apartheid and generally they had made the wrong one. They had been faced with another choice --whether to appear before the TRC, and again they had made the wrong choice. This showed, he said, that they "had not yet changed a mindset that properly belongs to the old dispensation
There is a legitimate question about both the Legal
Hearing's and my own focus on judges. After all, judges are but a small part of any legal order; indeed, they are a small part of any legal order's judicial system if we conceive such a system as including all those officials charged with making authoritative determinations of the legal rights of those subject to the law.
The cutting edge of any legal order -the place where subject meets the law -is going for the most part to be in the enforcement of the law by the police and in the adjudication of disputes about the law by magistrates. For this reason, some thought that the focus on judges at the Hearing distracted the TRC's inquiry from more important issues.
However, I believe such a focus to be productive. Robert
Cover, an American Professor of Law, showed why this is the case in his pioneering work on a group of judges in antebellum America who, despite their commitment to the abolitionist cause, almost relentlessly interpreted laws enforcing slavery in such a way as to shore up the institution of slavery."
Cover pointed out that studies of the relationship between law and justice -a relationship highlighted when one studies the role of law in implementing and sustaining injustice -for the most part accepted "the perspective of the established order".'
For such studies took the drama of the "disobedient" as exemplary of the problem -the stories of those who appeal to a "juster justice" beyond the law to justify disobedience. 10 Such disobedients, and any study which makes them exemplary of the relationship between law and justice, take the perspective of the established order because they assume that the law is what the powerful in that order suppose it to be. Such disobedients make their moral stand on the basis of the utter injustice of the law, an injustice created by the arbitrary will of a powerful and unjust ruler. And they therefore exclude the possibility that the law is more than the static embodiment of some ruler's will, determinable as a matter of plain fact.
It is important, Cover thought, that a study of law and justice canvass that excluded possibility by asking whether the law provides opportunities to do justice which rulers, no matter how powerful they are, cannot completely control. Only that possibility allows that the relationship between law and justice might be an intrinsic one, one which creates tensions within the law when the powerful use the law as an instrument of oppression.
Cover argues that it is adjudication by judges which best manifests the tensions which arise out of that intrinsic relationship when law is put in the service of injustice. For judges everywhere claim that their duty is not simply to administer the law, but to administer justice. Indeed, the oath of office which South African judges swore during apartheid stated that they would "administer justice to all persons alike without without fear, favour or prejudice, and, as the circumstances of any particular case may require, in accordance with the law and customs of the Republic of South Africa"."
As I pointed out in my own submission to the Legal Hearing, one can adopt the view that the justice of the law mentioned in the oath is simply the conception of justice which, as a matter of fact, the powerful have used the law to implement. 12 Alternatively, one can read some significance into the word justice, for example, by noting that the oath would look rather odd if one substituted for "justice" the phrase "ideology of the powerful".
Encapsulated in these two ways of viewing the relationship between law and justice is the age-old debate in the philosophy of law between legal positivists and natural law theory.
Positivists argue that the relationship between law and "juster justice" or true justice is purely contingent on political circumstance, while the natural lawyers argue that there is some intrinsic relationship. The complexity of that debate, especially in its more technical aspects, goes well beyond the confines of this essay. 13 But an important, and I would argue the principal, aspect of that debate is illuminated by a focus on the role of judges at the TRC, even though their role was confined to some written submissions. For if we are concerned with the relationship between law and justice, then, as Cover says, we cannot study that relationship without maintaining the possibility that it is an intrinsic one. The relationship has to be intrinsic if law is to provide a place where those subject to it can contest it when it is used as an instrument of brute and arbitrary power.
Only if the relationship is intrinsic can law provide the basis for judges to be more than the ants whom young Andrew Zondo encountered in the trial which culminated in his judiciallyordered death.
I will argue that the conclusion one should reach is a "When the very institution whose purpose is to realize human rights is used to trample them, when justice is turned against itself, the virtue of justice will be turned against itself too. Concern for human rights leads the virtuous person to accept the authority of the law, but in such circumstances adherence to the law will lead her to support institutions that systematically violate human rights. The person with the virtue of justice, the lover of human rights, unable to turn to the actual laws for their enforcement, has nowhere else to turn. She may come to feel that there is nothing for it but to take human rights under her own protection, and so to take the law into her own hands.""
Korsgaard suggests that such a decision is ethically different from most decisions we make. It is not the "imperfection" of justice -justice which fails to measure up to our sense of right and wrong -which is the basis for our decision. Rather the basis is the "perversion" of justice -the sense that it is injustice disguised as justice. Given the consequences that likely attend overthrowing an established order, the revolutionary cannot, she thinks, claim that he is justified in resorting to revolution. "That consolation is denied him. It is as if a kind of gap opens up in the moral world in which the moral agent must stand alone". 33 Korsgaard thus maintains that justification in such matters is always retrospective -everything depends on whether the revolutionary is successful in establishing a stable government."
Where Korsgaard goes wrong, however, is in suggesting We can think of a morally tragic situation as being one in which no choice can be made without ignoring the legitimate pull of important moral considerations. We have nevertheless to choose in such situations. And we have to try to make the best choice without the comfort -however the choice turns out -that the ignored considerations will cease to be legitimate. Even when one seems vindicated in retrospect, all one can say is that one did the best one could and that one is deeply sorry about one's complicity in the moral wrongs that resulted from one's choice.
Recall that at the same time as His choice, while tragic, was one which could be justified even at the time he made it, whatever the result. For the manner of its making opened up moral space for those who did not want to follow him, preferring to make their stand against apartheid from within the law. And, while they cannot be condemned for having decided to opt for the politics of legal opposition, they can and should be judged by how they behaved within that space.
However, those who took that stand had to cope with the moral question mark raised by the fact that one could with justification claim that the rule of law was best served by the politics pf armed struggle. This was especially true for lawyers whose path of legal resistance to the law involved using the law against the law. Not only did they make themselves vulnerable to being judged by their own standards, in contrast to the vast majority of lawyers who either actively supported apartheid or who were merely content to ignore oppression while reaping the benefits of legal practice. It was also the case that the more successful they were at using the law to challenge the law, the more they legitimated the legal order by helping to vindicate the government's claim to be part of the family of states committed to such fundamental Western values as the rule of law.
In the next section, I explore the question about why that situation could arise at all, that is, why it was the case that the space existed for law to be used to resist law.
Dilemmas of the Rule of Law
In nearly all the cases which are regarded as landmark decisions by the South African courts during the apartheid era, the basic question the judges had to answer concerned whether they should impose constraints of legality on executive decisions, including decisions about how to implement apartheid policy, decisions about the suppression of political opposition and the detention of opponents, and decisions about the content of regulations made under statutory powers. Examples of the legal principles at issue included the following: the principle that policy should be implemented in a reasonable or non-discriminatory fashion; the principle that someone whose rights are affected by an official decision has a right to be heard before that decision is made; the principle that, when a statute says that an official must have reason to believe that X is the case before he acts, the court should require that reasons be produced sufficient to justify that belief; the principle that no executive decision can encroach on a fundamental right, for example, the right to have access to a court and to legal advice, unless the empowering statute specifically authorises that encroachment; the principle that regulations made under vast discretionary powers, for example, the power to make regulations declaring and dealing with a state of emergency, must be capable of being defended in a court of law by a demonstration that there are genuine circumstances of the kind which justify invoking the power and The first option would have significantly decreased support for the government both in the international community and at home. 47 And had the government taken this option, judges faithful to their duty could have denounced such statutes for illegality -not for lack of compliance with some extra-legal ideal of justice, but for failing to be law. In other words, judges could then condemn the law not simply because they disagreed with it, but because the law profaned principles fundamental to maintaining legal order. In contrast, the second option -government submission to the rule of law -would have opened up precious space for opposition to apartheid from within.
In either case, the judges would have confronted the government with a rule of law dilemma. We saw that dilemma manifest itself for Bram Fischer as he contemplated taking his fight against apartheid underground. In his case, the dilemma was a genuinely moral one. His commitment to the rule of law required him to recognise that the values which he decided to pursue by revolutionary means were put at risk by a revolutionary course, and, more important, could still be fought for by legal means. In other words, the moral quality of his dilemma stems from the fact that a commitment to the rule of law informs both of its options.
In the case of the South African government, however, the rule of law dilemma was not moral but strategic. It was a dilemma between accepting the costs as well as the benefits of operation under the rule of law or doing without the legitimacy which attaches to government under the rule of law.
In confronting the government with the strategic rule of law dilemma, judges would have affirmed their commitment to a process that "does not defer to the violence of administration";" rather, the process seeks to impose the constraints of legality on a state which licences that imposition by its claim to be a However, the claim for immunity because of the need to protect judicial independence is hollow once one sees that judicial independence is itself an instrumental virtue: it is instrumental to ensuring the accountability of judges to the law.
And the majority of old order judges had failed to show fidelity to the law, had failed to take seriously a judicial oath which required them "to administer justice". As a Canadian judge once put it when judges in Canada raised a defence of total immunity to a summons to testify before a commission of inquiry: "[w]hen there is a real risk that judicial immunity may be perceived by the public as being advanced for the protection of the judiciary rather than for the protection of the justice system, the public interest ... requires that the question be asked and answered". 54 And in regard to collegiality, one has to take into 
